Abstract-Securing the physical components of a city's interdependent critical infrastructure (ICI) such as power, natural gas, and water systems is a challenging task due to their interdependence and large number of involved sensors. Using a novel integrated state-space model that captures the interdependence, a two-stage cyber attack on ICI is studied in which the attacker first compromises the ICI's sensors by decoding their messages, and, subsequently, it alters the compromised sensors' data to cause state estimation errors. To thwart such attacks, the administrator of the CIs must assign protection levels to the sensors based on their importance in the state estimation process. To capture the interdependence between the attacker and the ICI administrator's actions and analyze their interactions, a Colonel Blotto game framework is proposed. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game is derived analytically. At this equilibrium, it is shown that the administrator can strategically randomize between the protection levels of the sensors to deceive the attacker. Simulation results coupled with theoretical analysis show that, using the proposed game, the administrator can reduce the state estimation error by at least 50% compared to any non-strategic action. The results also show that the ICI's administrator must consider the CIs inside a city as a unified ICI for security analysis instead of assigning independent protection levels to each individual CI, as is conventionally done.
I. INTRODUCTION
The services delivered by a smart city's critical infrastructure (CI) such as power, natural gas, and water will be highly interdependent [1] - [4] . CIs are cyber-physical systems (CPSs) that encompass physical infrastructure whose performance is monitored and controlled by a cyber system, typically consisting of a massive number of sensors. These CPSs exhibit close interactions between their cyber and physical components [4] - [6] . The state estimation of the CIs, which uses cyber elements to monitor the physical elements, is a crucial stage for controlling their functionality. However, the interdependence between CIs and the high synergy between their physical and cyber components make them vulnerable to attacks and failures [7] - [10] .
Numerous solutions have been presented for securing state estimation of CPSs as well as for CI failure detection and identification [11] - [14] . In [11] , the authors presented a controltheoretic approach for attack detection and identification in noiseless environments using centralized and distributed attack detection filters. The works in [12] - [14] considered the estimation of a CPS under stealthy deception and replay cyber-attacks using a Kalman filter. Moreover, the security of interdependent critical infrastructure (ICI) has been studied in recent works such as [15] - [17] . In [15] , the authors assessed the security of interdependent power and natural gas systems under multiple hazards, considering the ICI's performance as a measurement for security. In [16] , the authors proposed an agent-based model to capture the effects of interdependencies and quantify the coupling strength between ICI. Also, the impact of natural and human-included disasters been studied in [17] .
Furthermore, the security and protection of sensor networks, which collect data from CIs, has been studied in [18] - [20] . In [18] , the authors proposed a novel method for physical attack protection with human virtualization in the context of data centers using sensors that detect an impending physical/human attack and, then, alarms to mitigate the attack. The authors in [19] , introduced a learning algorithm to extract features from the sensor messages to detect the cyber attacks. The work in [20] proposed a distributed observer for state estimation of CIs in lossy sensor networks with cyber attacks. The works in [21] - [23] used game-theoretic tools to study the interactions between the defender of a single CPS and an attacker that seeks to compromise the various nodes of a CPS.
However, the works in [11] - [20] do not consider the limitations of the available security resources for the protection, detection, and identification of CI attacks. For instance, in practical smart cities, resource limitations may substantially affect the security of the CIs. In a city, to prevent an attacker from breaking into the sensors of an ICI, numerous methods can be adopted such as encryption of sensor data, implementation of attack detection filters, or periodic monitoring algorithms. However, because of massive data transmission from sensors to the central processing unit, such security solutions will require a large number of computation, a high communication bandwidth, or a considerable amount of financial resources, all of which constitute limited resources for the ICI's administrator. Therefore, unlike the idealized security solutions in [11] - [20] , due to resource limitations, the administrator of an ICI has to prioritize between the protection of the cyber components of ICI based on their importance in the state estimation process [24] . Another key limitation in the current literature is that the majority of the existing works, such as [11] - [14] and [21] - [23] do not take into account the interdependence between the CPSs. Meanwhile, those that account for interdependencies such as in [15] - [17] are mostly based on graph-theoretic constructs that abstract much of the functionalities of the CIs. In practice, the functionalities of CIs in a city are largely interdependent and cannot be simply captured by a graph. For instance, power generation in generators which are supplied by natural gas requires instantaneous natural gas transmission from natural gas CI. Therefore, the sensors of each CI will collect the physical measurements of interdependent CIs and, to protect them from cyber attacks, the ICI administrator must consider realistic models for the CI interdependencies.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel gametheoretic framework for analyzing and optimizing the security of a large-scale ICI's state estimation. To build this unified security framework, this paper makes several contributions:
• We first introduce a novel integrated state-space model that captures the dynamics of an ICI consisting of power, natural gas, and water distribution systems. For enabling state estimation of the proposed ICI dynamics model, we implement a centralized Kalman filter that uses the sensor measurements collected to estimate the ICI's state.
• We consider a two-stage cyber attack that targets the sensors of the ICI so as to manipulate the state estimation.
In the first stage, the attacker aims to compromise the ICI sensors by breaking their protection algorithm (e.g., end-to-end encryption or sensor attack detection filter). In the second stage, the attacker manipulates the ICI's state estimation by altering the compromised sensors' data to induce state estimation errors. To defend against such attacks and protect the sensors, the administrator of the ICI can assign different protection levels to each group of sensors. The protection levels can vary across sensors for two reasons: a) the available resources which are used in the protection procedure are limited and b) the state estimation sensors have different importance levels.
• Since the actions of the attacker and the defender are interdependent, we propose a Colonel Blotto game framework [25] to analyze the interactions between the attacker and the administrator. In this game, the attacker chooses the set of sensors to compromise while the administrator assigns protection levels to the sensors. In contrast to existing works on Colonel Blotto for CPS security [21] - [23] , our game considers the interdependence between multiple CPSs. For this game, we derive the mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium for the administrator and the attacker as a function of their available resources and the maximum state estimation error due to the attack.
• We simulate a cyber attack to a power-gas-water ICI in which a sensor network collects data from the physical components of the ICI. Simulation results show that the mixed strategy for the administrator increases the protection of the cyber system of a large-scale ICI and reduces the estimation error of the ICI by at least a factor of 50% compared to a baseline case in which the administrator of the ICI does not randomize between the assignment of protection levels. Theoretical and simulation results also show that the ICI administrator must consider all the CIs as a unified system while assigning the protection levels to the sensors, rather than separately protecting them without accounting for their interdependence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the dynamic ICI model and studies the state estimation using Kalman filtering. In Section III, we analyze the maximum reachability of the estimation error. The gametheoretic framework is discussed in Section IV. In Section V, we present and analyze the simulation results. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. INTERDEPENDENT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ATTACK MODEL
Consider an ICI as a CPS whose physical system consists of three interdependent power, natural gas, and water distribution CIs and whose cyber system is a network of sensors that collect data from the physical components of the CIs and transmit it to a central processing unit. We first derive a state-space model for the physical system of each CI separately and then present the general ICI model. Finally, we discuss the associated cyber system and its vulnerability to attacks.
A. Physical System
The power system can be modeled as a linear dynamic system whose inputs are the electrical power demands from the load buses [26] and [27] . We focus only on generators that are supplied by natural gas [28] and we consider water as a requirement for the vapor condensation and cooling down in some of the generators [29] . Then, the dynamic model for a power infrastructure can be given by:
where A e is the power CI state matrix, B e is the power demand matrix, and C eg and C ew are the matrices of natural gas demand and water demand of power CI, respectively. Moreover, x e , u e , y eg , and y ew are vectors that capture power state variables, power demand, natural gas demand of power CI, and water demand of power CI.
The natural gas and water CIs are designed to supply natural gas and water to consumers in a city. Due to the pressure loss at the junctions of these two CIs, gas compressors and water pumps are used to compensate the pressure loss. We can thus capture the operation of the natural gas CI using the following dynamic model [30] :
where A g is the matrix of natural gas CI state variables, B g is the natural gas demand matrix, C g is the power demand matrix of the natural gas CI, and D g is the matrix of relationship between the natural gas output and power demand of natural gas CI. x g , u g , and y ge are the vectors of natural gas CI state variables, natural gas demand, and power demand of natural gas CI. Similarly, for the water CI, we have [31] :
where x w , u w , and y we are, respectively, the vectors of water CI state variables, water demand, and power demand of water CI. A w is the state matrix of water CI, B g is the water demand matrix, C g is the power demand matrix of water CI, and D g is the matrix of relationship between the water output and power demand of water CI. Note that, we derived all the matrices in (1), (2) , and (3) and the interdependence of CIs as summarized in Appendix A.
Considering the interdependence between power-gas-water CIs, we can derive a unified model for each CI as follows:
x e (t) = A e x e (t) + B e (u e (t) + T ge y ge (t) + T we y we (t)) ,
where
Here, T ge ,T we ,T ew , and T eg are matrices connecting the inputs and outputs of the three CIs whose elements are equal to one if the output of one CI is connected to the input of another CI or is equal to zero otherwise. By substituting (5) into (4), we will have the following state-space model for the interdependent critical gas-power-water infrastructure:
and A and B are defined in (8) . (6) captures the dynamics of an ICI. In this model, the state variables of three CIs are mutually interdependent, and changes in one CI can affect the other two CIs.
In Fig. 1 , we present an illustrative example of an ICI that can show the interdependence between the state variables of three CIs. In this example, we consider 10 generators out of which 6 are supplied by natural gas and 4 require water flow to operate. Here, 11 natural gas pipelines, and 11 water pipelines distribute natural gas and water to the demand junctions. Based on this example we find the matrices A and B in (6) and simulate the ICI. To illustrate how the changes in one CI can affect the state variables of other CIs, we increase the power demand in generator 5, u e 5 , at time t = 20.5. Fig. 2 shows the change of state variables of the natural gas pipeline between junctions 2 and 3 and state variables of water pipeline between the junctions 2 and 3. The reason is that any increase in power demand results in increase of electric power generation, and due to the interdependence between electric power generation and the consumption of the natural gas and water, the state variables of the natural gas and water CIs change.
B. Cyber System
To monitor the state variables in (6), a cyber system is needed. For the considered ICI , the cyber system will consist of a number of sensors spread around the ICI and collecting different measurements from the ICI's components. Sensors and meters in the power infrastructure measure the instantaneous frequency of the generator, the mechanical input power to the generator, and the line powers between the generators. In the natural gas and water CI, sensors collect the outlet pressure, and inlet flow rate of each pipeline. As shown in Fig.  1 , we consider a sensor network that is used to collect data from the ICI and send it to a central server. Each area in Fig.  1 corresponds to the set of all neighboring. The sensor data collected from each CI can be expressed as a linear equation of the states of the ICI, as follows: where x(t) is given in (6) , and y is a vector of all the sensor data at each time instant, and C is a matrix relating the states to the sensor data. However, due to the inaccuracy in measurements and the process noise in the infrastructure, the owner of each CI must estimate the system state at each time instant. Due to the interdependence between the CIs, their owners have to share the collected data from the components with a single administrator who has access to the ICI model [32] . Note that a lack of cooperation between the owners of the CIs can yield estimation error since the administrator will not be able to capture the interdependencies. Considering the process and measurement noise, and also the discrete sensor data, we can rewrite the state-space model equations and the sensor outputs as a discrete linear dynamic system:
where A, B, and C are defined in (6) and (9), x(k) ∈ R n is the vector of state variables of the ICI at time step k, u(k) ∈ R p is the vector of external inputs of the ICI at time step k, w(k) ∈ R n is the process noise at time k, and l(k) ∈ R p is the measurement noise at time k and p is the number of sensors. Due to the discrete sensor data, hereinafter, we use (10) in our analysis which is the discrete model for the ICI. For notational simplicity, we use (A, B, C) for the discrete state-space model, however, we transform these matrices to the discrete form using available methods such as bilinear transformation. Note that x(0) is the initial state of the ICI, and w(k), l(k) and x(0) are independent Gaussian random variables with x(0) ∼ N (0, Ψ), w(k) ∼ N (0, Φ), and l(k) ∼ N (0, Ω).
The ICI administrator seeks to estimate the state of the ICI using (10) . However, due to sensor error and operation noise, a noise-resilient method is needed to estimate the state variables. To this end, in [33] , the authors showed that by using a Kalman filter, one can compute the state estimation x(k) from observations y(k). Since the initial time of the ICI is considered −∞, the Kalman filter converges to a fixed gain linear estimator. To find the state estimate of the system, we first compute the Kalman state probability matrix P :
then, we compute the Kalman fixed gain as follows:
Next, we find the state estimation vector at time k dependent to knowing the state estimation at time k − 1,x(k|k − 1) as:
Finally, we compute the state estimatex(k|k) using a Kalman filter:
where the initial state is defined asx(0|0) = x(0).
We can define the estimation error at time k as the difference between the state x(k) and its estimatex:
Using (14) and (15), we have:
We also define the residue of the Kalman filter:
Because of process and measurement noise, we need to validate the estimation of the states and detect the failure of the estimation filter. We use X 2 failure detector allowing the detector computes the following value at each time step [34] :
where Z is the diagonal covariance matrix of the residue z(k), which implies that the residues are independent of each other. If g(k) exceeds the threshold level, then the detector will trigger an alarm.
C. Attack Model
Consider the cyber system of the ICI in Fig. 1 , where sensors collect measurements from the physical components of the ICI and transmit the measurement data to a central node in their proximity. Then different central nodes will transmit the data to a central server that will calculate the estimation of ICI state variables using the presented Kalman filter in (14) . We refer to the group of sensors which connect to a single central node, as a sensor cluster (SC). We consider a two-stage attack model to the cyber system of our ICI. In the first stage, the attacker aims to compromise the ICI's state estimation sensors by collecting their data and sending it to its central processor. After compromising some of the sensors, in the second stage, the attacker alters the sensor data to increase the estimation error of the ICI. In the first stage, the attacker has to break the security solution that is implemented by the administrator of the ICI (referred to as the defender, hereinafter).
Our model can be used to capture any ICI security solution that can include an end-to-end encryption of the sensor data [35] , an implementation of attack detection filter [11] , or a physical protection of the sensors [18] . Therefore, to compromise any SC inside the ICI, the attacker has to collect the broadcast data from the sensors to the central nodes and compromise the implemented security solution. However, this requires processing of the collected data from the sensors across the ICI, physical presence of the attacker in the proximity of the central nodes to collect data, or communication resources for transmission of the collected data to the attacker's central processing unit. Since processing, communication and human resources are limited, the attacker needs to prioritize between the sensors based on their importance in the state estimation of the ICI. From the defender's point of view, implementing the aforementioned security solutions, requires computational resources, communication bandwidth, or financial resources which are restricted in availability for the defender. Therefore, the defender must also prioritize between the sensors of the ICI that it seeks to protect.
In summary, the attacker aims to maximize the number of compromised sensors and the defender seeks to protect the SCs of the ICI from this cyber attack, under strict resource limitations at both sides. To analyze this interactions between the attacker and the defender, first, we analyze the second stage of attack to find the maximum estimation error caused by the cyber attack and quantify the importance each SC in the ICI, then using these values we can formally analyze the attackerdefender interaction and derive optimal defense strategies.
III. MAXIMUM STATE ESTIMATION ERROR IN THE COMPROMISED SENSORS
In this section, we analyze the impact of the second stage of the cyber attack in order to quantify the ability of an attacker to increase the estimation error by altering the sensor data. We assume a worst-case scenario for security analysis in which the attacker has complete knowledge about the system as done in [11] and was able to compromise some of the SCs in the first stage. We assume that the attacker can change the data of the compromised sensors to a desired value in order to disturb the ICI's state estimation. Given the set of all compromised SCs, A, we define attack vector y
T where N is the number of SCs, and y a i is the 1 × N i attack vector on SC i where N i is the number of sensors in SC i. Also, y i = 0 if i / ∈ A. Therefore, the linear relationship between the state variables of the ICI and the sensor data under attack will be:
whereȳ(k) is the vector of sensor measurements under attack, and y a (k) is independent from w(k), v(k), and x(0). Here, we assume that the attack to the sensors starts from k = 1. When the ICI's cyber system is under attack, the Kalman state estimation filter of the ICI in (14) changes as follows:
wherex(k|k) is the estimate of the states under attack. The new residue and estimation error are defined as follows:
We can define the error difference between the ICI under attack and in absence of attack as follows:
Using (14) and (20), we can find the following model for the difference in error and residue:
We define cumulative error difference (CED) at time step k:
where E ∈ R n×n is a positive semidefinite diagonal matrix which is the relative cost of each state error. For convenience, we define Q A − KCA which is a Hurwitz stable matrix since the ICI model is a stable system [33] . Next, we derive the maximum CED caused by an impulse attack to an SC. Proposition 1. If Q is a Hurwitz stable matrix, then the maximum CED caused by an impulse attack to a set of sensors A is:
Proof. Since y a (1) is a vector with y a (1)[i] = 0 for i / ∈ A and the attack is an impulse input, then, we have y a (k) = 0 for k > 1. Therefore, using (23), we have
. For a stable system, the impulse response of the state vector ∆e(k) returns to the origin at k → ∞ for an arbitrary error deviation in k = 1, ∆e(1), or:
for any ∆e (1), where the columns of M are the eigenvectors and Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of Q [33] . Assume that λ i where i = 1, . . . , n are the eigenvalues of Q, then, all the elements of ∆e(k) are a linear combination of components λ
. And since in a Hurwitz stable matrix
Therefore, we have:
where E[i, i] is the element in the i-th column and i-th row of matrix E. Note that based on the definition of diagonal semi definite matrix, E[i, i] has a non-negative value. (28) states that the maximum value of q(k) for k > 1 occurs in q(2). Thus, the maximum value of q(k) is max{q(1), q(2)}. Since the initial condition of ∆e(k) is ∆e(1) = −Ky a (1), this results in:
This proves (26) .
Proposition 1 shows that the maximum CED caused by an impulse attack occurs during first two time instants, q(1), q(2), after the initiation of the impulse attack to the sensors. In the presence of the attack, the failure detector in (18) computes the following value in each time step:
Now, we define two new parameters for the analysis of probability of failure in the system as follows:
where β(k) andβ(k) capture probabilities of failure in absence and existence of attack, respectively, and g t is the failure trigger threshold. Definition 1. An impulse attack to set A is α-feasible if:
Using [14, Theorem 1], we can directly prove the convergence ofβ(k) to β(k) as D(z(k)||z(k)) → 0, as follows.
Lemma 1 shows that, if the probability of alarm triggering β(k) at time k increases by a value of in presence of attack, β(k) = β(k) + , then, there exists a value for α such that an impulse attack can be designed with a KL distance lower than α. Now, if the attacker wants to design an α-feasible impulse attack then it should change the sensor data such that the KL distance never exceeds α. Next, we find the maximum KL distance caused by an impulse attack to a set of sensors.
Lemma 2. If Q is a Hurwitz stable matrix, then the maximum KL distance caused by an impulse attack to a set of sensors A will be:
Proof. From (23) and (24) we have:
therefore, all the elements of vector ∆z(k) will be a linear combination of eigenvalues of Q powered by k − 2, λ
where S[i, i] is the element in the i-th row and i-th column of S. In addition, since Z is a diagonal matrix with positive entities, then its inverse has positive values, hence S =
0. (39) implies that the KL distance is decreasing for k > 2, and hence, the maximum KL distance will occur in k = 1, 2, or 3 and this proves (36) .
Lemma 2 finds the maximum KL distance caused by an impulse attack to a set of sensors. We use the maximum error caused by an impulse attack and maximum KL distance to find the maximum CED caused by an α-feasible attack in the following theorem. This theorem essentially quantifies the maximum CED that the attacker can cause without triggering the alarm to a set of sensors.
Theorem 1. The maximum CED caused by an impulse α-feasible attack to a set of sensors A is the solution of the following quadratic program with quadratic constraints:
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that the maximum CED caused by an impulse attack which we define it as vector y a in time step k = 1 to a sensor set A is: 
then, y a should maximize (43) with constraints in (44), and considering y a [i] = 0 for i / ∈ A. Also, since E and S are positive definite matrices then R 1 , R 2 , P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 are all semi positive definite matrices. Because of positive semi definitiveness, (40) is a convex function and (41) is a convex bounded constraint and the solution of the maximization problem will lie at the boundaries [36] .
Theorem 1 provides a method for the attacker to find the maximum CED caused by altering a set of sensors without triggering failure alarm. To solve the optimization problem in Theorem 1, known techniques such as quadratic programming can be used [36] . Using theorem 1, we can assign a value to quantify the maximum CED for each of the ICI's SCs. To do so, for each of the ICI's SCs we calculate the following value:
where ϕ i is the value of SC i in the state estimation and N i is the set of sensors inside SC i. This value captures the importance of each SC for the attacker and the defender in the first stage of attack, because the attacker can increase the estimation error by ϕ i in the second stage of attack after compromising the SC i in the first stage. Based on this value both the attacker and the defender can prioritize between their actions in the first stage. Since we can now quantify the importance of different SCs under attack, next, we study how the ICI can defend against the first stage of attack during which the attacker and the defender should allocate their available resources on all the SCs based on their values.
IV. ICI SECURITY RESOURCE ALLOCATION AS A COLONEL BLOTTO GAME
In this section, we analyze the resource allocation of the attacker and the defender in the first stage of the cyber attack. In the considered model, the available resources for the defender and attacker are denoted by R d , and R a , respectively. Consequently, the defender and the attacker must simultaneously allocate their resources across a finite number of SCs, N . Moreover, each SC in ICI i has a value, ϕ i (A, B, C) given by (45) which quantifies the maximum CED caused by compromising SC i. This value captures both the cyber and physical nature of the ICI as per (45). Hereinafter, we use subscripts a and d to denote the attacker and the defender, respectively.
Also,
T denotes player j's allocation vector across N SCs. In each SC i, the defender assigns a protection level which requires r d i resources. In contrast, the attacker spends some effort to break the sensor's security mechanism, which requires r a i resources in SC i. For instance, in end-to-end encryption, for any encryption algorithm the defender must consider a number of computations in the decryption of each SC's messages in the central server [35] . To break this encryption, the attacker must collect the messages of each SC and break the encryption using a large number of computation, which requires the attacker to assign a portion of its available computational resources for each SC. Such a resource limitation is not restricted to cases of encryption as it can also be applied to other protection methods such as attack detection filters [11] .
Therefore, for any protection method, in each SC, if the defender allocates more resources than the attacker then the defender prevents that SC from being compromised. In this case, we assign the normalized value of SC i to the defender and zero to attacker if the defender wins SC i. In contrast, if the attacker allocates a higher number of resources in each SC, then the attacker can compromise that SC. In this case, we assign the normalized value of SC i to the attacker and zero to the defender if the attacker wins SC i (i.e., in this case, the CED is zero, and the defender perfectly protects its SC). Also, in case of equal allocation of resources, which has the probability of zero due to the continuous action space of the attacker and the defender, we share the normalized value of each SC equally between the attacker and the defender. Therefore, in each SC i, the normalized payoff for the attacker and defender is given by:
where −j is the opponent of j and
The total payoff of the defender and the attacker resulting from allocations across all N SCs is the sum of the individual payoffs in (46) received from each individual SC:
Here, we define the total CED caused by the allocation vectors r a and r d as follows:
since u a (r a , r d ) captures summation of the estimation errors from all the SCs. The attacker aims to increase its utility function in (48) by maximizing the number of compromised SCs which results in maximizing the total state estimation error. Also, the defender seeks to increase its utility function in (48) by maximizing the number of protected SCs from the cyber attack to minimize the state estimation error. Moreover, the payoff for each player depends on the actions of both players and, thus, we can use a game-theoretic approach to solve this problem [37] . In particular, next, we first model the problem as a two-player Colonel Blotto game [25] between the attacker and the defender, and then present the solution for the game. The Colonel Blotto game framework is particularly suitable for the considered ICI security problem since, in this game, two colonels simultaneously allocate their available military resources on N battlefields, where the winner of each battlefield is the colonel with a more allocated resources and both the colonels aim to maximize the number of won battlefields. This is similar to the problem in (48), in which SCs are the battlefields and the defender maximizes the number of protected SCs while the attacker seeks to maximize the number of compromised SCs.
A. Game Formulation and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
To model the interdependent decision making processes of the attacker and defender, we introduce a noncooperative Colonel Blotto game
, {u j } j∈P defined by six components: a) the players which are the attacker a and the defender d in the set P {a, d}, b) the strategy spaces Q j for j ∈ P, c) available resource R j for j ∈ P, d) number of the SCs N , e) normalized value of each SC i for j ∈ P, φ j i (A, B, C), and f) the utility function, u j , for each player. For both players, the set of pure strategies Q j corresponds to the different possible resource allocations across the SCs:
Also, the utility function of each player, u j , can be defined as in (48). The utility function in (48) is a symmetric case for the Colonel Blotto game where φ One of the most important solution concepts for noncooperative games is that of the Nash equilibrium (NE). The NE characterizes a state at which no player j can improve its utility by changing its own strategy, given the strategy of the other player is fixed. For a noncooperative game, the NE in pure (deterministic) strategies can be defined as follows: Definition 2. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game is a vector of strategies [r a * ,
such that ∀j ∈ P, the following holds true:
The NE characterize a stable game state at which the defender cannot improve the protection of the ICI's SCs by unilaterally changing its action r d given that the action of the attacker is fixed at r a * . At the NE, the attacker cannot increase the state estimation error of the ICI by changing its action, r a , when the defender keeps its action fixed at r d * . However, the NE is not guaranteed to exist in pure strategies. In particular, for a Colonel Blotto game, without loss of generality, if R d > R a , then it can be proven that, for N R a > R d there exist no pure-strategy NE [25] . However, it is proven that there exists at least one NE in mixed strategies [38] for noncooperative games. When using mixed strategies, each player will assign a probability for playing each one of its pure strategies. For an ICI security problem, the use of mixed strategies is motivated by two facts: a) both players must randomize over their strategies in order to make it nontrivial for the opponent to guess their potential action, and b) the allocation of resources can be repeated over an infinite time duration and mixed strategies can capture the frequency of choosing certain strategies for both players. A mixed strategy, which can be termed as a distribution of resources, for player j is an N -variate distribution function G 
B. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Solution
In a game-theoretic setting, each player chooses its own mixed-strategy distribution to maximize its expected utility. We first derive the solution for a special case of our problem in which the attacker and the defender consider the expected allocation of their resources on each SC instead of exact allocation. This is a special case of the Colonel Blotto game known as the General Lotto game [39] . In a Colonel Blotto game, the sum of allocated resources cannot exceed the limited resources for the players as in (50). In contrast, in a in General Lotto game, the sum of expected allocated resource on SCs cannot exceed the restricted resource of players:
where E j i (r) is the expected value of resources allocated by player j on SC i. In this case, the utility of each player j ∈ P is defined as the expected value over its mixed strategies:
Therefore, player j's optimization problem considering its constraint on the available resource is:
where ζ j is a multiplier for player j's expected resource allocation constraint. For each i = 1, . . . , N , the corresponding first-order condition for maximizing (54) is given by: d
where (55) is equivalent to the necessary condition for a single all-pay auction game where player j's value for the prize in auction is φ j i ζ j [40] . In such an all-pay auction, if
the solution of (55) is described as follows:
Now, to find the multipliers (ζ a , ζ d ), let µ 
From [39, Propostion 1] we know that there exists at least one solution to system of equations in (58) and (59). Now that we characterized the functions that maximize the expected utility of players in (53), we first define the solution concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) and then, finalize the solution of Lotto game by deriving its MSNE. The MSNE is defined as follows: Definition 3. A mixed strategy profile G * constitutes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if for player j we have:
60) where G j is the set of all probability distributions for player j over its action space Q j .
The MSNE for this game characterizes a state of the system at which the defender has chosen its optimal randomization over the allocation of resources on SCs and, thus, cannot improve the protection of ICI's SCs by changing this choice. Also, the MSNE for the attacker is a probability distribution that captures the allocation of its resources over the SCs in a way to maximize the state estimation error when the defender chooses its MSNE strategies. Using the definition of the MSNE, we define the expected CED at MSNE as follows:
It is proven in [39, Theorem 1] that for each solution (ζ d , ζ a ) for system of equations in (58) and (59), each player in a General Lotto game has a unique MSNE with univariate marginal distributions in (56) and (57). In the following proposition, we characterize the solution for our problem when the values of the ICI's SCs for both attacker and defender are equal and, then, we find the expected state estimation error.
Proposition 2. For the problem of resource allocation over SCs having equal values for the attacker and the defender φ
, at the MSNE, the MDFs for the attacker and the defender, when the defender's resources are greater than the attacker's resources, R d ≥ R a , will be given by:
and the expected CED at MSNE will be
solution for the system of equations in (59) and (58) is
Then, substituting ζ a and ζ d into (56) and (57) results in marginal distributions in (62) and (63). To find the expected utility of the attacker, we have:
Also, the expected utility of the defender can be derived as:
and from (61) the expected CED at MSNE is:
The value
ϕ i captures the expected estimation error of ICI for the case in which, in the first stage of the attack, the available resource for the attacker and the defender are R a and R d , respectively. From Proposition 2, we can conclude two important points: a) the probability of allocation of resources greater than
as much the ratio of the attacker's available resource to the defender's available resource, R a R d , increases, the expected state estimation error increases. Next, we prove that, if the defender concentrates only on one of the CIs without considering their interdependence, then the expected estimation error increases.
Theorem 2. Suppose the sets N e , N g , N w contain the SCs inside the power, natural gas, and water CIs. Then, the ICI's expected estimation error increases if the defender does not consider the interdependence between the CIs.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that the defender only protects the water CI while the attacker considers all of the ICI's SCs. In this case, we assume that the value of the SCs in the natural gas and power CI for the defender is ε → 0. The water CI's SCs, however, will have new values as follows:
while the values of SCs for the attacker are similar to (47). Then, the ratio of the values for the attacker and defender is as follows:
To find the values of ζ a and ζ d we consider two cases for µ: If µ < κ, then Ω a (µ) = N , and, thus, from (58) and (59) we have
and from (58) and (59) we
R a ≥ κ. Therefore, the MDFs for the attacker and the defender are:
Using above distribution functions and (61), we can find the expected CED at the MSNE as follows:
To reduce the expected CED in Proposition 2, we must have:
and since κ < 1 then we need to have
which results in a contradiction because we know that R a R d ≤ 1. Therefore, the defender is never better off if it does not allocate resources to the water infrastructure. Hence, when the defender allocates its resources only on a subset of CIs, although the expected allocated resources on these CIs increases, the estimation error of their states will also increase due to the interdependence of the state variables of the ICI.
Theorem 2 illustrates the role of the interdependence between power, natural gas, and water CIs in the state estimation. The defender must consider all the CIs and their interdependence in the security analysis. Otherwise, if the defender only protects one of the CIs, then the attacker can cause higher estimation error on all the state variables of the ICI.
The solutions presented in Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 are for the General Lotto game in which the constraints on resources hold true in expectation as in (52 
Then, we can apply the solution of the General Lotto game in Proposition 2 to the Colonel Blotto game
Finding ψ that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3 is computationally hard for large values of N . Thus, we now prove that, for special values of SCs when the number of SCs is sufficiently large, we can apply the solution of the General Lotto game in Proposition 2 to the Colonel Blotto game. 
Theorem 3 provides a condition for the SCs to apply the solution of Proposition 2 to our Colonel Blotto game, under the more general constraint on resources in (52). The following corollary proves that, in an ICI with a large number of SCs, the normalized values of SCs, φ i , can be approximated such that the condition in Theorem 3 can be satisfied.
Corollary 1.
If there exists 0 < φ < 1 such that φ i ι i φ where ι i is an integer number for i = 1, . . . , N , then as long as max i {ι i } < 2 N , then the solution of the General Lotto game in Proposition 2 constitutes an MSNE for the Colonel Blotto game under the resource constraints in (52).
In this section, we derived two key theorems. Theorem 2 highlights the importance of interdependence in the security analysis and proves that the defender cannot minimize the state estimation error by allocating resources to a single CI. Moreover, we characterized the solution of our Colonel Blotto game for the ICI model in Theorem 3 and we derived the expected estimation error at the MSNE as a function of the attacker's and the defender's available resources.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we study the ICI example in Fig. 1 which captures a real-world ICI scenario such as in [16] , [27] , [30] and [31] . In this ICI, each power generator and each junction in the natural gas and water systems has a demand profile, which specifies power, gas, and, water demand, at each time. We design A and B such the dynamic ICI model constitutes an asymptotically stable system. Also, we consider 32 SCs which collect sensor data from different physical components. Based on the sensor network architecture in Fig.  1 , we generate the matrix C. In our simulations, we consider 0.5-feasible attacks that we use to compute the values of the SCs, φ i (A, B, C) . Moreover, due to the large number of the SCs and small values of the SCs, we can approximate the values of the SCs as φ i ι i 10 −4 and max i {ι i } = 661 < 2 32 which satisfies the condition in Corollary 1 and, therefore, the solution of Blotto game in Theorem 3 will hold. In Fig. 3 , we simulate the presented ICI in Fig. 1 for the case in which the ratio of the available resources is
Over 50 simulation runs, both players, empirically, play their MSNE based on the MDFs in Proposition 2. The average percentage of compromised SCs in this case is 11% which is very close to the theoretical expected percentage of the compromised SCs which is Fig. 3 shows that since the attacker and the defender randomize between their strategies in each simulation, the percentage of compromised SCs of each simulation might differ from the theoretical expected percentage of compromised SCs. However, the average To analyze the efficiency of the MSNE , we consider three baseline approaches: a) both players play their MSNE (which is the solution of the game), b) the attacker allocates a portion φ i of its resource on SC i while the defender plays best response, and c) the defender allocates a portion φ i of its resource on SC i while the attacker plays a best response. The best response of player j is the pure strategy which maximizes its utility function. Fig. 4 shows that, when the defender allocates a portion φ i of its resource on SC i without mixing the allocation of resources, the attacker can predict the defender's strategy and compromise more SCs. In contrast, if the attacker allocates a portion φ i of its resources on SC i without playing a mixed strategy, then the defender can protect almost all the SCs since it knows the exact amount of attacker's allocated resource on each SC. Thus, the attacker is clearly better off randomizing using an MSNE. Therefore, Fig. 4 shows that if the defender plays MSNE, it can protect the SCs at least 50% better than the case in which it allocates a portion φ i of its resource to every SC i. Moreover, Fig. 4 shows that, as much the portion of the attacker's resources to the defender's resources increases, the percentage of the compromised SCs by the attacker increases.
In Fig. 5 , we simulate the use of Kalman filtering for the estimation of one of the ICI's state variables, ω 6 , in presence of the attack and in absence of the attack, for two values of Fig. 5 shows that the estimation of the state variable ω 6 causes 10 times higher error in the case of To explain this result, from Proposition 2, we know that the expected estimation error of the attack is
Hence, the error caused by the attacker increases by a factor of (
To analyze the interdependence between the three CIs, we simulate our model for cases in which the defender protects only one of the CIs. Fig. 6a shows the average percentage of compromised SCs. From Fig. 6a , we can see that the defender loses more SCs to the attacker by concentrating on the security of only one CI. Moreover, Fig. 6b shows the average CED caused by the cyber attack on the ICI. Fig. 6b shows that the estimation of state variables of each CI depends on the data of the SCs in other CIs. Therefore, when the defender focuses only on one CI to protect, the attacker can disturb this CI's state estimation by attacking to the SCs in other CIs. The simulation results in Fig. 6 corroborate the theoretical results in Theorem 2, where we proved that the defender cannot protect the estimation error by allocating its resources only on one CI without considering the interdependence between the CIs.
In Fig. 7 , we analyze the estimation error of one of the state variables of the pipeline between junction 2 and 3 of natural gas CI. In this simulation, we examine two games where in first case, we consider that the defender can allocate resources to all the SCs of ICI, while in the second case, we consider that the defender can only protect the SCs of the natural gas CI. Note that the ratio between the players' resources is R a R d = 0.25 in two cases. Fig. 7 shows that, at MSNE although the defender protects only the SCs of the natural gas CI, the average estimation error of a natural gas CI state variable in this case is larger than the estimation error in the case of protecting all the SCs of ICI. Moreover, although the allocated resources on natural gas CI is increased but from Fig. 7 we see that the average estimation error in natural gas state variable is increased with the factor of 0.47 0.18 = 2.6. This difference between the error estimation of two cases is very close to the theoretical expected utility of the attacker in Theorem 2. From Theorem 2, we know that the ratio of the expected utility of the attacker in two cases is (
= 0.38. Therefore, the ratio of the expected utility of the attacker in two cases is 2.86. Fig. 7 illustrates the interdependence of three CIs. To protect the states of only one of the CIs, the defender has to consider the interdependence of CIs, and allocate its resources on all the SCs of ICI not only the CI which it desires to protect.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the problem of allocating limited protection resources on sensor areas (SCs) of an ICI using a game-theoretic approach. We have modeled the dynamic system of interdependent power, natural gas, and water infrastructure. We have analyzed the state estimation of the states of an ICI and the maximum reachability of estimation errors of different SCs of the ICI. We have considered a general model of protection of SCs of an ICI when the available resources of the defender and the attacker are limited. In particular, we have formulated the problem of allocating the limited resources of the defender and the attacker as a Colonel Blotto game. We have derived the MSNE of the defender and the attacker in closed-form as a function of the values of SCs and the available resources for the attacker and the defender. The derived MSNE gives insights on the allocation of the resources on each SC and also underlines the interdependence of the three infrastructure. The defender's best strategy when trying to protect only one of the infrastructure is to allocate the available resource on all the SCs of the ICI not only on the infrastructure which it aims to protect. Simulation results verify that the derived MSNE is the best strategy for the defender and due to the interdependence of three CIs, the defender must consider ICI as a unified system in the security analysis.
APPENDIX A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DYNAMIC MODEL
In this appendix, we derive a dynamic system model for the power, natural gas, and water CI. Moreover, we analyze the dynamic model of interdependence between these three CIs.
A. Power Infrastructure
To analyze the power system, we consider a synchronous generator connected to a transmission line as the study system. For a large-scale power system, consisting of n e generators interconnected through a transmission network, the model derived in [26] and [27] is used. In this model, each generator is considered as a subsystem, with the input to each subsystem i being the power demand from the connected bus, P ei . Any changes in the power demand, P ei , will result in a change in the frequency of the generator and the mechanical input to the generator. The block diagram of two connected generators is shown in Fig. 8 . In this model, the dynamics of each subsystem i can be written as follows: Mechanical dynamics:
(78) Mechanical feedback dynamics:
Line dynamics: 
All the parameters in the above equations are defined in Table  I .
Using (78) 
and x l is a vector with size n l consisting all the line powers P ij . Also, H e i is a row vector with entities as follows:
is the m-th entity of vector x l .
In (82), the input to a subsystem, u e i , is the demand power from each generator, P ei . Any change in power demand results in the deviation of state variables. Since one of the state variables in (82) is the mechanical power input to the generator, P mi , then any change in the demand power will result in the deviation of mechanical power input to the generator. However mechanical input to the generator is excited by an external input such as nuclear energy, coal, natural gas, wind, or water flow. Here, we focus on dynamics of the generators excited by the natural gas and for the other types of generators we assume a known mechanical input without any dynamics. We also assume that the mechanical input to the generators supplied by natural gas is proportional to the flow rate of arriving gas to the generator from the natural gas network. Therefore, we have P mi = η Table II. Power generation is also dependent on some form of water input. For instance, thermal power generation requires large volumes of water for cooling purposes. Hydroelectric power requires flowing water to drive generating turbines [28] . We model the dependence of the power generation on water using the boiler turbine dynamics presented in [29] . Since control of the generator's temperature requires water flow to the generator, the relationship between the input water and the generator's mechanical power can be written as: Table III. (82) considers each generator separately. However, to analyze the power infrastructure as a unified system we need to define a centralized model for the power system. In this regard, we present the state space model in (1) , where
. . . Fig. 9 : Block diagram of natural gas pipeline model
and y eg and y ew are the vectors of natural gas and water demand from power system, respectively. Also e g and e w are the vectors whose entities are the indexes of generators require natural gas and water.
B. Natural Gas Infrastructure
To analyze the performance of a natural gas system, we need to model the transient flow of the gas pipelines, as done in [30] . In this model, the inlet pressure and outlet flow rate at each pipeline are the inputs to the pipeline system. Also, the outlet gas pressure and the inlet flow rate are the outputs of the pipeline. The reason that outlet flow rate is the input of the pipeline system is that the outlet flow rate determines the demand gas flow rate in the output of the system. Also, the pressure in the inlet of the pipelines is controlled by the components such as the compressor. Therefore, we consider the inlet pressure of the pipeline as another input to the pipeline system. The block diagram of a pipeline is shown in Figure 9 and the state space equations for a pipeline are derived as follows:ẋ
and the outputs of the pipeline are:
The parameters τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ,τ 1 , ρ 1 , andρ 1 are computed from the linearization of the pressure and gas flow rate inside the pipeline. For detailed analysis, the reader can refer to [30, Annex A] . Other variables in the natural gas network are described in Table II . In the network of gas distribution system, we need to take into account the connection between the pipelines. To do so, first we consider that the summation Parameter Description g in ij the gas pressure at the inlet of the pipeline connecting junction i to j g out ij the gas pressure at the outlet of the pipeline connecting junction i to j g comp i the pressure produced by the compressor in the junction i g def i the predefined pressure in the junction i ϑ d i the gas flow demand in junction i ϑ in ij the gas flow rate at the inlet of the pipeline connecting junction i to j ϑ out ij the gas flow rate at the outlet of the pipeline connecting junction i to j γ ij
The sector area of a pipeline between the junction i and j n out i Number of pipelines suppling junction i n pipe g Total number of the pipelines in the gas system Table II: Natural gas system parameter description of inlet gas flow rate in the junctions has to be equal to the summation of the outlet gas flow rate. Therefore, the inletoutlet gas rate relationship in each junction i is as follows: A compressor in each junction compensates the pressure loss [43] . The power required at each compressor i is a function of the pressure produced by the compressor and can be expressed as follows:
where g def i is defined by the designer of the system based on the characteristics of the junction. Therefore, the gas pressure in the inlet of the pipelines is fixed. Now, we can write the state space model of a pipeline between junction i and j in the gas CI as follows: .
and y ge i is defined the power demand in the compressor of each junction i.
The relationship in (97) considers the dynamics of a single pipeline system. To analyze the natural gas system as a unified system, we propose the centralized state space model consisting of all the state variables of all the pipelines in (2) , where
. . . , we need to start from the last pipelines in the natural gas infrastructure and find the outputs of these pipelines and use them as the inputs of previous pipelines. By proceeding this method until reaching to the source junction of natural gas we can derive the entities of mentioned matrices.
C. Water Infrastructure
To analyze the water infrastructure we use the analytical framework presented in [31] . In this model the flow rate is considered constant in the outlet and inlet of each pipeline. Moreover, the relationship between the flow, inlet and outlet pressure of the pipeline can be expressed as follows:
where all the parameters are described in Table III . Figure  10 shows the block diagram model of the pipeline in water system. Also at each junction of water system the summation of inlet flow has to be equal to the summation of the outlet 
Moreover, due to the pressure loss in the pipelines, there exist a water pump in each junction which controls the pressure of water in the junctions. Then, the water pressure relationship in each junction is as follows: The power needed for the pump in each junction i is a function of pressure provided by the pump and can be written as follows:
where w def i is a predefined value by the designer of the water system which indicates the fixed inlet water pressure in each pipe.
Similar to the natural gas system, we can present the state space model for each pipeline in the water system as follows: 
